Ram Orzach

Title: Professor of Economics
Office: 323A Elliott Hall
Phone: (248) 370-4965
Email: [email protected]

Education:
Ph.D.  Games with Asymmetric Information

Biography:
Ram Orzach specializes in models of asymmetric information that violate the single-crossing condition. To better understand the models, and their influence on the modern business environment, see for example, the papers: “Modest Advertising Signals Strength” and/or “Strategic Dropouts” below.

Teaching interests: 
Microeconomics

Research interests: 
Models of asymmetric information that violate the single-crossing condition. Law & Economics.

Journals and Articles:

Orzach, R. , Stano, M. Supersizing: The Illusion of a Bargain and the Right-to-Split. Other. 19

Hodge, T. , Orzach, R. , Silberman, J. (2023). Higher Education Decision on Covid-19 Vaccine Mandate. Applied Economics Letters. 30(7), 11

Orzach, R. , Stano, M. (2021). On the degree of distortions under second-degree price discrimination. Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design. 6101-112

Einy, E. , Mridu Goswami, M. , Haimanko, O. , Orzach, R. , Sela, A. (2017). Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information. International Journal of Game Theory. 46(1), 72-102

Einy, E. , Haimanko, O. , Orzach, R. , Sela, A. (2016). Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information and Bid Caps. International Journal of Game Theory. 45(Special Issue: In honor of Abraham Neyman), 63-88

Malueg, D. A., Orzach, R. (2012). Equilibrium and Revenue in a Family of Common-Value First-Price Auctions with Differential Information. International Journal of Game Theory. 41(2), 219-254

Forges, F. , Orzach, R. (2011). Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions With Common Values. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 47(6), 760-767

Malueg, D. A., Orzach, R. (2009). Revenue Comparison in Common-Value Auctions: Two Examples. Economics Letters. 105(2), 177-180

Orzach, R. , Spurr, S. J.(2008). Lesser-Included Offenses. International Review of Law and Economics. 28(4), 239-45

Orzach, R. , Tauman, Y. (2005). Strategic Dropouts. Games and Economic Behavior. 1(50), 79-88

Einy, E. , Haimanko, O. , Orzach, R. , Sela, A. (2002). Dominance Solvability of Second-Price Auctions with Differential Information. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 37147-258

Orzach, R. , Overgaard, P. B., Yauman, Y. (2002). Modest Advertising Signals Strength. RAND Journal of Economics. 33340-358

Einy, E. , Haimanko, O. , Orzach, R. , Sela, A. (2001). Dominant Strategies, Superior Information and Winner's Curse in Second-Price. International Journal of Game Theory. 30(3), 405-419

Orzach, R. , Tauman, Y. (1996). Signaling Reversal. International Economic Review. 37453-464